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A. INTRODUCTION 
The proposed Regulation of the European Parliament and 
the Council on a Common European Sales Law, (COM (2011) 
635 final) (hereinafter CESL), introduces a very interesting 
choice of law structure. It creates a novelty among European 
legislative instruments and certainly among other traditional 
choice of law instruments.
It seeks to implement the choice made by the European 
Commission to provide for a second contract law regime, 
not the “29th regime” following the results gleaned from the 
Green Paper in January 2011 (The European Commission, 
Green Paper from the Commission on policy options for 
progress towards a European Contract Law for Consumers 
and Businesses, COM(2010)348 final (2010)). As a result, 
how does the CESL relate to pre-existing international 
substantive contract law such as the 1980 Vienna Convention 
on the International Sale of Goods (hereinafter CISG) and 
other substantive international contract law instruments? 
Does it successfully cast aside choice of law problems or does 
it risk isolating itself and with it the European community of 
traders and consumers from the rest of the world? How can 
coherence between international and EU common market law 
be achieved? 
Many authors have commented on aspects of these 
questions both before and after the publication of the current 
Commission proposal. Recommendations ex post, ie upon 
examination of the published outcome of the year-long drafting 
process, have included the limitation of the scope of the CESL 
to electronic contracts (as proposed by the Law Commissions 
of England and Scotland in 2012 as well as the Legal Affairs 
Committee of the European Parliament in September 
2013, although under the heading of distance selling, see 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
%2f%2fEP%2f%2fNONSGML%2bIM-PRESS%2b20130
916IPR20025%2b0%2bDOC%2bPDF%2bV0%2f%2fEN 
, accessed on December 8, 2013). Other recommendations 
seek to limit the scope to consumer contracts only (see Sixto 
A Sanchez-Lorenzo, “Common European Sales Law: Some 
Critical Remarks” 9 Journal of Private International Law (2013) 
191-217, 216; M Heidemann, “The Common European Sales 
Law Proposal - European Private Law at the Crossroads?” 
(2012) 91 Amicus Curiae 2-11; The Law Commission and Scottish 
Law Commission, An Optional Common European Sales Law: 
Advantages and Problems. Advice to the UK Government (The 
Law Commission, Scottish Law Commission, 2011), 39).
Authors have also examined the impact on non-European 
traders, as well as the general private international law (PIL) 
setting of the CESL and in relation to the role of other EU 
legislation. The picture remains fragmented.
This paper seeks answers and suggests solutions, especially 
in respect of the lex contractus status of a potential sales law 
instrument. It looks at the possibilities of an express choice 
of the CESL by the parties to a potential contract employing 
the CESL. The first part of the paper (A-C) briefly sets out 
the proposed structure and content of the CESL in order to 
provide a basis for an analysis and recommendation in the 
second part (D-F). The aim of this research is to suggest a 
consistent solution to the problems arising on the one hand 
from the (widely detected) defective drafting of this proposal, 
as well as from the underlying status quo of current European 
private international law doctrines relating to lex contractus, 
both on an EU level and within the national laws. 
Reflected by the current Rome I choice of law system, 
which is based on the premise that only state law can be lex 
contractus, traditional antagonism has unfolded around the issue 
of the role of the state in current private law so that there is a 
debate over the role of private actors in lawmaking and that of 
the public sphere and the public interest as an opposing and 
restricting force (see for further discussion D Schiek, “Private 
Rule-making and European Governance-Issues of Legitimacy” 
(2007) 32 European Law Review 443–66 and M Heidemann, 
“Private Law in Europe – The Public/Private Dichotomy 
Revisited”, (2009) 20 European Business Law Review 119-39).
This debate is unresolved and therefore does not allow an 
easy transition from the current status quo of EU and Member 
States’ (MS) PIL into what some authors see as a modern and 
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more appropriate choice of law model, with instruments like 
the CESL or the CISG being available to be made lex contractus 
of an international, “cross-border” contract. Any method of 
achieving this must respond to concerns of the opponents of 
such a solution rather than insisting on controversial models 
of justification and explanation derived from political or 
sociological theories, for instance those suggesting a global 
delocalized society, partly based in cyberspace – as  in the case 
of participants in e-commerce and “social media” seeking a 
lex electronica comprising mainly self- regulation but raising 
concerns as to the effects of abuse and transgressions ranging 
from breach of intellectual property law to physical and 
personal injury on the remaining “analogue”’ society.
Such a society would preferably be self-regulated. 
Traditionally led by national and international merchants 
and their commercial organisations and dispute settlement 
mechanisms, this example is followed in the so-called digital 
age by the above-mentioned cyberspace community (this 
perception is illustrated by G-P Callies, “Transnationales 
Verbrauchervertragsrecht” (2004) 68 Rabels Zeitschrift 244–
87 and also by J H Dalhuisen, Dalhuisen on Transnational 
Comparative, Commercial, Financial and Trade Law (Oxford, 4th 
edn, Hart, 2010), 205). Nation states may perceive this form 
of self-regulation as secretive and anarchic and thereby a threat 
to sovereignty and public order. 
Further reservations against the use of conventions, model 
laws, “general principles” or indeed the CESL as lex contractus 
also arise from other legal considerations such as vagueness, 
incompleteness and an absence of central adjudication – or 
indeed as an interpretation standard in the course of applying 
international substantive contract law beyond the limitations 
expressed in Article 7, CISG and other contract law conventions 
which revert to national law via conflict rules once the uniform 
instrument has been fully explored.
These latter concerns can equally be resolved using a method 
based on a thorough review of the underlying motivations for 
such choices. What follows will not address the full range of 
possible choices of law clauses or suggest a draft wording of 
a choice of law rule enabling such choices. The focus here is 
on the express choice of law made by the parties to a potential 
European or third party sales contract and the legal nature of 
uniform international law as a basis for a way forward.
B. EXISTING CHOICE OF LAW RULES IN 
THE CESL – STRUCTURE AND CONTENT 
1. Structure
The choice of law rules in the CESL are spread over different 
sections of the instrument. Reference to choice of law can be 
found in the Explanatory Memorandum (EM), the Preamble 
and in the Regulation itself. Annex I, which contains the actual 
sales law, does not include any choice of law rules.
This may be modelled on a civil law practice to maintain 
separate codes or an “introductory” code as in Germany in 
relation to the substantive civil law and to separate the legal 
nature of such rules from each other. In the CESL, however, it 
is not simply the structure that is unusual but also the content 
and wording of the rules.
In line with the role that a Preamble plays within EU 
legislation or indeed the more rarely found Explanatory 
Memorandum (EM), the rules referring to choice of law 
occasionally seem to be suggestions rather than instructions 
(should... may be....). Where they are not, but worded in a 
definitive mode (will..., does not amount..., is..., is to be...) 
the question is why they are not part of the Regulation itself 
or Annex I.
2. Content
The CESL seems to distinguish the “material, territorial and 
personal scope” of the sales law (Art 3 of the Regulation) from 
the more general legal nature and setting of the CESL within a 
national and international context. The latter is embedded in 
the narrative of the EM in sections 1 and 3. The EU legislators 
are adamant that the CESL is to be regarded as national law 
forming a “second contract law regime” within the domestic 
law of the MS. This description is to be found within the EM 
on pages 6 and 8 of the English version pdf, and in sections 1 
and 3 concerning the “context” and “legal elements” of the 
proposal, partly repeating the same words. Apart from the 
information that the CESL is meant to be a separate national 
contract law, it can also be understood from these paragraphs 
that not only is choosing the CESL “by agreement” not a choice 
of law in the sense to be discussed here, but that commonly 
understood choice of law is expected to be made prior to the 
choice of the CESL (s 1 of the EM). 
Eventually it emerges from this that a choice of law in 
the traditional sense has to be made first, prior to the use of 
the CESL, for it to become operative. This choice is to be 
made according to the established EU legislation on private 
international law, the so-called Rome I and II Regulations 
on the law applicable to contractual and non-contractual 
obligations (Regs (EC) 593/2008 [2008] OJ L177/6 and (EC) 
No 864/2007 [2007] OJ L 199/40 respectively).  Effectively, 
this means that parties need to choose the CESL within 
any given MS law. It is questionable therefore whether the 
CESL is meant to be one uniform source of law for “cross-
border” contracts in the sense described in Article 4(2) and 
(3) of Annex I, or rather 28 different sources, ie 28 CESLs, 
each being regarded as an “integral part” of the respective 
national law. This expression is taken from the ELI statement, 
Article 3(2) of the drafting proposal. The number 28 is used 
symbolically here to represent the current number of Member 
States in the EU but of course the number of contract laws in 
the 28 Member States is greater (eg in the UK there are three 
main legal systems: England and Wales, Northern Ireland, and 
Scotland).
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A choice of the CESL would therefore be the CESL of 
state X, or the law of state X and its CESL, or the X CESL, 
eg the German, French or Spanish CESL. This description 
of the CESL’s legal nature entails a great amount of ensuing 
questions, some of them very similar to those arising in the 
context of traditional uniform law such as the CISG, even 
after adoption, ratification and implementation into national 
laws (see below at D.5. (a)).  P Mankowski: “Rechtswahl für 
Verträge des internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs” (2003) 
Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft 1, 2-15 illustrates how the 
CISG, even though implemented into German civil law by 
way of the EGBGB (Introductory Law to the Civil Code) is 
still regarded as an alien item remaining subject to German 
mandatory laws. How bizarre that a state should sign up to a 
treaty that might violate or undercut its own laws. His views are 
not in line with the award of December 29, 1998 rendered by 
the Schiedsgericht Hamburger Freundschaftliche Arbitrage in 
Hamburg, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft vol 5 1999, pp 394-
96, p 395 (II.3), which applied German law complementary to 
the CISG clearly accepting the CISG as lex contractus.
The elements of the above-mentioned “material, territorial 
and personal scope” are thus not to be regarded as connecting 
factors in the sense of private international law but rather 
application criteria with the effect of excluding the domestic 
law to the extent that the CESL will then apply. In addition 
to the territorial scope formed by the location of the habitual 
residence of the trader, subdivided into place of business and 
central administration in Article 4(4) of the Regulation, and 
the “address indicated by the consumer”, delivery address 
and billing address (Arts 3 (a) and 4 of the Regulation) these 
include the identity of the contracting parties as consumers, 
traders or SMEs as well as the content of the contract. Out 
of these formative elements of the CESL’s scope, the first is 
certainly the most complex and unusual. The territorial scope 
uses the term “cross-border” contract’ as a definition which 
is itself defined by those elements contained in Article 4(2) 
and (3) (a) and (4), and the further element of one of these 
locations being in a MS, Article 4(2) and (3) (b).
C. COMPARISON WITH INTERNATIONAL 
UNIFORM LAW AND EUROPEAN LAW 
INSTITUTE STATEMENT 
In the following paragraphs I will make reference to the 
solutions suggested by the European Law Institute (ELI), 
a recently formed academic organisation with its secretariat 
based in Vienna. This is by way of selecting just one out of 
the numerous contributions that have been made by the 
Committees of the European Parliament and in the wake of 
their consultations, as well as academic contributions. The 
ELI has contributed a black letter draft to accompany their 
statement which also shows a tabled synopsis of their suggested 
amendments (Statement of the European Law Institute on the 
Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law 
COM (2011) 635 final, ISBN: 978-3-9503458-1-0, officially 
“endorsed” in September 2012 and presented at the Inter-
Parliamentary Committee Meeting of the European Parliament 
Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) on  November 27, 2012. The 
working party on the CESL is chaired by Sir John Thomas. 
The statement is freely available from the publications section 
of the ELI  at http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/
user_upload/p_eli/Publications/S-2-2012_Statement_
on_the_Proposal_for_a_Regulation_on__a_Common_
European_Sales_Law.pdf).
A comparison lends itself particularly to the 1980 Vienna 
Convention on the International Sale of Goods (CISG - 
Text available from UNCITRAL at http://www.uncitral.org/
pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf , 
accessed on December 8, 2013). This convention also receives 
special attention within the EU proposal at the Preamble, 
Recital 25. Here, the EU drafters recommend that where the 
scope of the CESL and the CISG overlap, “the choice of the 
Common European Sales Law should imply an agreement of 
the contractual parties to exclude that Convention”. The choice 
of language suggests that this is a recommendation, but since 
it is not obvious to whom this may be addressed it could also 
be read as an interpretation rule for the contractual agreement 
once concluded, or even an implied term. The absence of 
reasons given for this choice does assist the clarification of 
this point. Another paragraph on the CISG in the EM merely 
states that the CISG had no overarching adjudicating body and 
therefore lacks uniform interpretation without linking this 
expressly to Recital 25 and suggesting this as a reason. The 
fact, however, that a case database collecting national decisions 
on the CESL is required for the CESL (EM s 4 (Budgetary 
implications, Rec 34, Art 14 CESL) shows that the creators 
do want to draw on the experience with the CISG and indeed 
other instances where this method has been used, such as by 
UNIDROIT (CLOUT, UNILEX).
Three aspects of the CISG should be observed here in 
comparison with the CESL – its scope, its objectives and some 
of its interpretation and method rules.
1. Scope of the CISG
Article 1, CISG defines the scope in two steps. Paragraph 
1 describes international or “cross-border” contracts without 
using the actual term “contracts for the sale of goods between 
two parties whose place of business is in different States”. 
Paragraph 2 specifies that these different states need to be 
either both contracting states or that the law of at least one 
contracting state must be applicable by way of conflict rules. 
The “cross-border” element can be disregarded if the conflict 
rules point to a contracting state (Art 1(2)), so the second 
element is conditional on the first. In the CESL, the first 
element, the “cross-border” nature of the second, is defined 
by the second. The CESL describes a “cross-border” contract 
as being one where at least one party has their place of business 
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etc in an MS. This obvious deviation from the use of this 
expression in ordinary language is explicitly justified by using 
it “for the purposes of this Regulation” (Art 4(2)). 
The CISG also expressly excludes the use of positively 
or expressly defined personal or material criteria for the 
determination of its scope (Art 1(3)), and instead moves on 
to defining the limitations of its scope in the negative, by 
way of discounting or excluding certain contractual purposes 
(“personal, family or household use”), types of goods and 
manner of acquisition in Article 2 (a) to (f).
CESL takes a contrasting approach to the CISG by making 
the identity or personal criteria of the contracting parties the 
main point of reference (consumers, traders, SMEs).
2. The objectives
The objectives of the CISG are described in a brief Preamble, 
those of the CESL in the very extensive EM and Preamble. Both 
instruments share the need to justify their existence against 
the general doctrine of sovereignty as they deal with uniform 
law for use in several independent jurisdictions. The CISG, 
however, uses the established platform of an international 
diplomatic conference at a stage in the drafting process where 
state representatives are authorised to sign a convention. 
The convention then follows its life cycle from adoption to 
ratification and implementation. The CESL, peculiarly, has to 
overcome an obstacle that lies in the way of its adoption which 
is coming from the very treaty authorising its drafters. 
The legal basis for the CESL is contentious, even though 
only four MS filed objections against the choice of Article 114 
TFEU (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) as 
a legal basis (approximation of MS laws) thereby not halting 
the legislative process. Therefore, not only the CESL’s legal 
nature but also its objectives receive extensive attention in the 
proposal. Only certain objectives (harmonisation, uniformity 
only in certain specified areas) are acceptable under the Treaty 
for the CESL – all Union objectives are listed in Title 1 of the 
TFEU – but not for the drafters of the CISG. This is so despite 
the EU claiming to be a jurisdiction of its own. The legal order 
sui generis may not be explanation enough, though, to convey 
the legal effect of the CESL (see Martijn W Hesselink, “How to 
opt into the Common European Sales Law? Brief Comments 
on the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation”, Centre for the 
Study of European Contract Law Working Paper, Series No 2011-15, 
(Conclusion), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950107, 
accessed on December 8, 2013).
At this point the first manifest difference between the 
two instruments shows its significance – the CISG is an 
international treaty, the CESL is secondary law prepared by 
an executive body within a supranational organisation. Both 
instruments are of a public law nature carrying substantive 
private law rules addressed to private parties. While this is 
certainly a pioneering quality, it begs the question about the 
aims and objectives of such instruments. Both instruments 
may also pursue the same objectives.  
The CESL lists its objectives most concisely in Article 1 of 
the Regulation. It reads as follows:
Objective and subject matter
1. The purpose of this Regulation is to improve the conditions 
for the establishment and the functioning of the internal market 
by making available a uniform set of contract law rules as set out 
in Annex I (‘the Common European Sales Law’). These rules can 
be used for cross-border transactions for the sale of goods, for the 
supply of digital content and for related services where the parties 
to a contract agree to do so.
2. This Regulation enables traders to rely on a common set 
of rules and use the same contract terms for all their cross-border 
transactions thereby reducing unnecessary costs while providing a 
high degree of legal certainty.
In relation to contracts between traders and consumers, this 
Regulation comprises a comprehensive set of consumer protection 
rules to ensure a high level of consumer protection, to enhance 
consumer confidence in the internal market and encourage 
consumers to shop across borders.
The CISG outlines its objective in the Preamble:
PREAMBLE 
The States Parties to this Convention,
 Bearing in mind the broad objectives in the resolutions adopted 
by the sixth special session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations on the establishment of a New International Economic 
Order,
 Considering that the development of international trade on the 
basis of equality and mutual benefit is an important element in 
promoting friendly relations among States,
 Being of the opinion that the adoption of uniform rules which 
govern contracts for the international sale of goods and take into 
account the different social, economic and legal systems would 
contribute to the removal of legal barriers in international trade 
and promote the development of international trade,…
Both instruments are aimed at removing barriers in 
international markets, even though the EU market is referred 
to as the “internal market”. As this market place stretches 
across a number of independent states, it is an international 
market. Both instruments want to provide a uniform source of 
law, or “set of rules”. The CESL also uses the word “common” 
in para 2 of the article. While the CISG wants to “promote 
international trade”, the CESL also adds “a high level of 
consumer protection” to its objectives.
These objectives seem to be largely overlapping, except 
of course that of consumer protection. The objectives are 
realised by the respective scope of both instruments but also 
by interpretation and application rules. The desired uniformity 
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results both from using a single uniform source of law and 
applying it in a uniform way. This latter aim is promoted by the 
interpretation rule of Article 7 CISG:
Article 7
 (1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be 
had to its international character and to the need to promote 
uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in 
international trade.
The creators of the CESL seem to doubt the workability of 
this solution though:
“...and there is no mechanism which could ensure its uniform 
interpretation” (EM, p 5).
The CESL itself, however, does not offer any “mechanism” 
to ensure a uniform interpretation. The word uniformity is 
used only in regard of the uniformity of the single source, 
the uniform set of contract law rules. The creators of the 
CESL most likely did not see a necessity to emphasise the 
intended role of the CJEU to ensure uniformity of the CESL’s 
interpretation. They did however copy the idea of a national 
case database which is current practice in respect of the CISG 
and other uniform instruments, as mentioned above. The 
reason for this is not clear. The national cases within these 
databases do not have a legally binding relationship with each 
other. If they are consulted by national judges it is in the spirit 
of Article 7(1) CISG, but arguably voluntarily. The CESL does 
not include a provision comparable to Article 7 CISG, so the 
reason for the database remains at best unaddressed at worst 
not understood. Recital 34 of the Preamble mentions legal 
certainty as the aim of this database but does not explain what 
the role of the national (“final”) judgments would be.
The ELI statement allocates a whole section to the database 
(Part B, s 2, Implementation). It sets out in great detail what 
the setting should be (accompanied by a digest, allocating cases 
to specific courts, etc). The crucial point however of exactly 
what would be the legal basis for any national judge to refer to 
a case of another national court is not spelled out there either, 
rather it is only indirectly identified as a problem. Paragraph 69 
comes closest by using the expression “authoritative”, stating 
that: “First, if the database is to be a properly authoritative 
record of judicial decisions from across the EU only properly 
authoritative judgments should be placed on it.”  The 
“Executive Summary” (p 16) uses the expression “uniform 
interpretation” as an aim and “judicial co-operation” as a 
means to achieve this. This expression may be less general as 
it appears in the absence of any detailed measures of such co-
operation because the term has of course a place in established 
EU terminology (Art 81, TFEU) and is associated with specific 
activity that originated as part of the “third pillar”.
The CISG further contains the reference to the “international 
character” of the convention as guidance for its application and 
interpretation, and it contains a method in section 2, Article 7 
addressing so-called internal gaps of the convention. 
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention 
which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity 
with the general principles on which it is based or, in the absence 
of such principles, in  conformity with the law applicable by virtue 
of the rules of private international law.
This wording is echoed in the CESL in Article 4, paragraph 
2 of Annex I, the actual sales law:
(Interpretation) ...
2. Issues within the scope of the Common European Sales Law 
but not expressly settled by it are to be settled in accordance 
with the objectives and the principles underlying it and all its 
provisions, without recourse to the national law that would be 
applicable in the absence of an agreement to use the Common 
European Sales Law or to any other law.
The Commission introduces a comprehensive set of 
interpretation rules with the CESL, especially in Article 2, as 
though concentrating developments in uniform international 
law and doctrine over the past decades, culminating in the 
express use of the term autonomous for the interpretation 
method (Art 2(1), Annex I, “is to be interpreted 
autonomously”). This article also stipulates the objectives 
and underlying principles as an interpretation criterion (Art 
4(1)) which could be seen as a principle of international legal 
doctrine as it is contained in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties 1969 (Art 31). 
However, the CESL is not international law according to its 
creators but national law, and so the question arises as to the 
meaning of the choice of legal instrument and its application 
method.
D. EVALUATION
1. No desired effect of second domestic contract law regime
The main aspect defining the choice of law rules in the 
CESL must be seen in its legal nature as national law. This 
begs the question of whether there is any choice of law rules 
specific to the CESL at all. The objective of regarding the CESL 
as national law of the MS seems to be – besides allowing its 
creation under the TFEU – the avoidance of a need to modify 
the relevant provisions of the Rome I Regulation (“Unaffected 
by the proposal”, CESL, EM, s 1 (p 6)). This objective applies 
especially to its Article 6 on consumer protection rules, or 
indeed any other aspect of established doctrine of private 
international law, in particular the doctrine of (overriding) 
mandatory laws, as expressed in Article 6(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation. The argument reads like this:
[Art. 6(2) Rome I Reg] can have no practical importance if 
the parties have chosen within the applicable national law the 
Common European Sales Law. The reason is that the provisions 
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of the Common European Sales Law of the country’s law chosen 
are identical with the provisions of the Common European 
Sales Law of the consumer’s country. Therefore the level of the 
mandatory consumer protection laws of the consumer’s country is 
not higher and the consumer is not deprived of the protection of 
the law of his habitual residence.
Article 6(2) of the Rome I Regulation reads:
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1, the parties may choose 
the law applicable to a contract which fulfils the requirements of 
paragraph 1, in accordance with Article 3. Such a choice may 
not, however, have the result of depriving the consumer of the 
protection afforded to him by provisions that cannot be derogated 
from by agreement by virtue of the law which, in the absence of 
choice, would have been applicable on the basis of paragraph 1.
This wording does not seem to make a comparison between 
individual rules of the CESL and a consumer’s law of his or 
her habitual residence (home law hereinafter for simplicity) 
dispensable. The rule does not establish a hierarchy between 
the chosen law and the consumer’s home law by level of 
protection afforded, it is based on the quality of a norm as 
mandatory. There is no reason why a court would not exercise 
a value judgement comparing the level of protection afforded 
to a consumer party to a contract governed by the CESL and 
the rules of his home law in any individual case. It is highly 
doubtful that his problem can be solved by making the CESL 
part of the national laws of each MS. 
As the attainment of a high level of consumer protection is 
one of the objectives pursued by the CESL, this aspect is very 
important to avoid a conflict with existing Union law without 
undertaking to change such law.
In this passage the creators of the CESL thus make it very 
clear that the choice between the law of a country and the 
choice of the CESL is “the Common European Sales Law 
of the country chosen”. It claims that those provisions are 
identical with those of the country of the consumer’s habitual 
residence. This, however, is not self-evident.
If the CESL is really 28 CESLs as described above, it must 
be asked if the rules are identical in each of the MS simply 
by becoming part of the national legal culture. Secondly, the 
identity or sameness of those rules is not the criterion under 
Article 6(2) of the Rome I Regulation which alleviates the 
prevalence of the mandatory rules in the consumer’s home 
country. Besides, a choice of the CESL of state X does not 
entail a choice of the CESL in the consumer’s home country 
if that is not state X, and so the judiciary in the home country 
may be free to undertake exactly that value judgment about 
the rules of the CESL the EU Commission wants to avoid and 
declare the CESL incompatible with mandatory home law 
protecting the consumer party. There is no reference to the 
legal effect of an unchosen CESL, say the consumer’s home 
CESL, while another MS CESL is part of the law governing the 
contract. Is CESL dormant when it is not activated by a choice? 
Obviously, this is an unprecedented model of a legal nature.
Therefore, the passage in the EM explaining this mechanism 
is futile and can only be rendered workable either by the 
addition of an express suspension of Article 6(2) of the Rome 
I Regulation; or by adding a stipulation that the mandatory 
rules referred to in Article 6(2) are limited only to the CESL 
of the consumer’s home state; or making the CESL truly one 
source of law directly applicable in 28 MS and not 28 second 
contract law regimes. This may seem overly sophisticated, but 
it is crucial for the development of private international law as 
well as transnational, ie “cross-border” contract law.
The aim of creating a uniform source of “cross-border” 
contract law ought to be the guideline for the choice of the 
legal nature of an intended CESL. The proposed Regulation or 
indeed any law created at EU level such as a Directive, treaty or 
framework decision is a uniform source of law from the point 
of view of the MS. So, the second step of declaring the CESL 
to assume the form of 28 CESLs appears to be very artificial 
indeed, and would therefore most likely be overlooked by 
potential contractual parties and lawyers, too. The very use of 
the extended name CESL of state X or its variations as listed 
above will be discouraging and flag up the fact that a “choice” 
of the CESL may not result in the desired legal certainty, 
simplification and uniformity.
It is against this background that choice of law under the 
CESL is to be discussed. This consideration does not appear 
in the ELI statement. The statement does not question the 
assumed legal nature of the CESL as national law, possibly 
because the drafters did not undertake to challenge the policy 
choices made by the EU legislator (see the Preamble of the 
statement on p 11 of the printed version). However, this is not 
a policy choice but rather part of the instrument itself. 
The fact that the EU legislator has made the choice of 
creating a second contract law regime seems to explain the 
position of the choice of law aspects and the description of 
the legal nature of the CESL in the Preamble and the EM. 
The actual Regulation and Annex I presuppose this status 
and accordingly set out the scope and interpretation methods 
not in the context of international law or in the context of 
multiple independent jurisdictions but within any one of 
the MS jurisdictions and in the context of the CESL and the 
“surrounding” national law of its respective MS. 
Such a choice has not been possible before, and seems to be 
a novel type of choice of law. 
It is questionable whether a European or indeed non-EU 
based consumer would understand the sophisticated nature 
of this process. If a consumer decides to buy goods from a 
trader under the CESL, say from his desk top computer, he 
may be given the choice of the “blue button”, the famous 
image conjured up by the drafters of the CESL and the DCFR 
(see Study Group on a European Civil Code/Research Group 
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on EC Private Law (Acquis Group) (ed), Principles, Definitions 
and Model Rules of European Private Law: Draft Common Frame of 
Reference (DCFR). Interim Outline Edition, (München, Sellier, 
2008)). What would be the precise content of the agreement 
to use the CESL? Would it be sufficiently clear to the consumer 
that he is asked to choose first the law of a country and then 
that country’s CESL (it actually does seem to be the drafters’ 
intention for the consumer or trader to make two choices in 
chronological order going by the wording of the proposal)? 
Would this really give the consumer the reassurance to trust 
that promised uniform source of law? Would the consumer, 
despite being informed by the Standard Information Notice 
in Annex II, be fully aware of the nature of the choice he is 
making and the nature of the law he is choosing? Why, if the 
choice of law in the traditional sense is just that, would the 
consumer need extra information? Should not the consumer 
be given the choice of all 28 CESLs in the form of a list?
The scenario seems bizarre and technocratic. But it highlights 
the weakness of the chosen method of implementation and use 
of the CESL designed by the EU Commission.
The consumer’s imagination of a Common European Sales 
Law would in my view naturally be that of a single source of law 
which is directly applicable in all MS. The consumer would be 
misled under the current model.
2. No implementation
It is also questionable if the desired effect of making the 
CESL a second contract law regime is actually achieved by the 
draft proposal. Interestingly, this is not doubted by scholars 
commenting on the proposal (see M W Hesselink, “How to 
opt into the Common European Sales Law? Brief Comments 
on the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation”, Centre for 
the Study of European Contract Law Working Paper Series (2011) 
(available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950107, accessed on 
December 8, 2013) and see also the comprehensive article by 
S Whittaker “The Proposed ‘Common European Sales Law’: 
Legal Framework and the Agreement of the Parties” (2012) 75 
Modern Law Review 578). 
Nevertheless, what the Commission is proposing does 
not seem a self-evident or previously tested legal mechanism. 
The legal nature of the CESL as domestic law and a second 
contract law regime is not contained in the operative text of 
the Regulation itself as mentioned above. The description of 
this legal nature is contained in the EM and the Preamble, even 
using mandatory language. However, whether or not this effect 
follows from the adoption of the Regulation at EU level and the 
position of this objective in the preliminaries of the actual legal 
instrument that the EU has designed to bind its MS directly 
does not appear unequivocal. An EU Regulation has the legal 
effect of creating directly applicable separate uniform law 
effective in all MS. But how, without formal implementation, 
the content of the Regulation can be made to have the legal 
effect of a second contract law regime, is not clear. There is 
no precedent for this mechanism, and there may be, as some 
authors and MS submit, no legal basis for it. The discussion 
takes a different course depending on whether the question is 
pursued as to what can be achieved under TFEU rules or what 
could be achieved from a general perspective. 
Tellingly, the ELI statement includes a section on 
implementation, while the CESL does not expressly mention 
this word as it may be a give-away of the latent problem. The 
ELI statement politely discusses those elements of the CESL 
that can be regarded as implementation measures, such as 
the database, an advisory body and a digest. All those are of 
course informal and not part of the approved and authorised 
instruments of the EU arsenal of measures to enforce EU 
policies and laws.
If the desired effect of “introducing” is to be regarded as 
failing, then the CESL would have to be regarded as a truly 
uniform instrument, a single source of substantive contract 
law directly applicable in all MS. The nature of a choice of 
this instrument does not follow easily from that, though. Can 
a regulation be “chosen” under existing private international 
law?
Another indication of the awareness of the drafters of the 
ambiguity of their model of the CESL as a second national 
contract law regime could be the use of language which is 
widely found in international uniform law, conventions and 
model laws with a private law subject and also in Article 31 
(1) of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) of 
1969 which provides general rules for interpretation of treaties. 
It is conceivable that the autonomous interpretation method 
proposed in Article 4 of Annex I can be employed to interpret 
a national legal instrument with a view to streamlining its use 
in one MS with that in the 27 other MS and isolate it from the 
surrounding national law within its scope. Without the defining 
factor of this interpretation in the light of the objective and 
purpose, however, this method may be deprived of its effect 
because each country has its own doctrinal principles guiding 
the users, be they the parties or the lawyers adjudicating or 
advising on their transaction. 
Uniformity is not straightforward to achieve in this 
way, despite the thorough consideration of all elements of 
established interpretation methods for uniform instruments 
including the treatment of internal gaps. The decisive criterion 
must be the one element contained in the CISG which is not 
repeated in the CESL, “regard... to its international character.”
3. Object and objectives 
The object and purpose of a convention is commonly 
used as a factor in the interpretation and application of an 
international treaty, according to the VCLT 1969 and also a 
number of modern uniform instruments drafted and promoted 
by UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL. Article 4 of Annex I refers to 
them in both paragraphs as an interpretation criterion. Objects 
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and objectives or purposes have to be distinguished. The object 
of the CESL is the “cross-border” contract as defined by 
Article 4 of Annex I. The objectives are the removal of (non-
tariff) trade barriers within the EU and the fostering of the 
internal market as well as a high level of consumer protection.
The “cross-border” contract under the CESL may be limited 
to an EU related “cross-border” contract but it undoubtedly 
retains an international element. Cross border activity must 
involve separate sovereign jurisdictions. The international or 
transnational element is subdued though by the emphasis on 
national contract law. This type of uniform law poses a special 
paradoxical dilemma. The term “international” traditionally 
describes the interaction of states about public concerns. 
In the area of substantive contract law, the acting parties are 
private individuals, usually only two, acting for their own 
sake only and establishing voluntary temporary relationships. 
The state traditionally does not act in this format and has 
not commonly curtailed but rather privileged and benefitted 
from these relationships throughout history (see for instance 
M Heidemann, Methodology of Uniform Contract Law - the 
UNIDROIT Principles in International Legal Doctrine and Practice 
(Berlin, Springer, 2007), 1.1.3.2 and 8; P Grossi, Das Recht 
in der Europäischen Geschichte (Munich, Europa Bauen, C H 
Beck, 2010), 119/123 and M Schmoeckel, Rechtsgeschichte der 
Wirtschaft (Tuebingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 93 (No 93)).
Party autonomy is the mode of acting of these private parties. 
The essence of a contract as a voluntary mutual, reciprocal and 
usually bilateral private agreement escapes state regulation. 
The state also does not benefit directly from those transactions, 
only indirectly by way of taxation and general welfare of its 
population unless of course there is a state party contractor. 
It is therefore not straightforward for states to claim sovereign 
rights in regard to their contract law other than as a “cultural” 
asset or heritage, and it therefore equally needs an explanation 
what the motivation for states can be to provide substantive 
contract law for use at transnational level, such as the CISG. A 
more refined view on the benefit of an improved infrastructure 
for international trade as described in the Preamble of the 
CISG may be such a motivation. But it begs the question of 
the alignment of objects and purposes with the content of such 
instruments in their scope and content. Unavoidably, the state 
negotiators arrive at the limits of their ability to concur with 
a typical outcome such as the one described in the paragraph 
about the limitations and deficiencies of the CISG in the EM 
of the CESL.
4. Effect of legal nature of instrument on choice by third 
parties
The fact that the EU legislator has chosen a Regulation 
over a convention must allow conclusions about the object and 
purpose of the CESL.
A uniform instrument providing rules of contract law 
for “cross-border” contracts may have the fostering of 
international trade and ensuing welfare as an objective, but 
the object is the international contract itself. The CESL starts 
by defining this object as being an EU related “cross-border” 
contract and does not have an international contract in the 
traditional sense in mind. The CESL is meant to be internal 
EU law, interpreted by referring to established principles of the 
interpretation of EU law according to Recital 29, CESL. The 
CESL’s objective is to improve the functioning of the internal 
market and not global or international trade in general. It is 
therefore necessary to criticise these aims if one would desire 
a Chinese and a Swiss trader, as the ELI statement puts it in 
paragraph (14), to be able to “choose” the CESL. 
The ELI statement does of course acknowledge that those 
non-EU traders would choose the law of a MS and its CESL, 
but it is not clear why they could be motivated to do that. 
Secondly, the  formulation on page 20 , paragraph (13) of the 
statement, that traders would be deprived from selling “into 
the whole EU/EEA under one and the same legal regime”,  is 
unfortunately wrong because the CESL provides 28 regimes 
which are declared to be the same but may not be or remain so.
The Chinese and the Swiss trader would submit themselves 
to the law of the chosen MS as well as to the “well-established 
principles on the interpretation of Union legislation” (Rec 29, 
CESL). Given the motivations behind choice of law, this may 
not be as desirable as the drafters of the ELI statement think 
for non-European traders.
The availability of the CESL for non-European parties is 
most likely not among the objectives of the EU legislator. The 
multitude of objectives could be analysed to see if the opening 
of the CESL to third party traders is desired and possible.
Besides providing an improved infrastructure for traders in 
view of the difficulty that Article 6(2) Rome I Regulation poses 
to them, two important objectives of the CESL drafters are 
the achievement of a high level of consumer protection and of 
course the unchanged status of private international law in the 
Union. Another objective is to maintain Article 6(2) in order 
to avoid having to work out a solution in a reform process for 
the choice of law rules to permit the direct choice of the CESL.
5. Private international law and choice by third parties
The two issues perceived as indispensable for both 
consumer protection and state sovereignty are the rules about 
lex contractus and the doctrine of mandatory rules in the form of 
Article 6(2). Both would need changing if a true transnational 
law was to be provided for “cross-border” contracts that could 
reasonably be chosen by non-EU parties.
(a) Lex contractus
The question of whether a law can be chosen to be lex 
contractus, the law governing the contract to the exclusion of 
other laws, has been debated in the past decade, leading to a 
draft paragraph in the first proposal to the Rome I Regulation 
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presented by the Commission to the effect that certain types 
of transnational non-state laws should be allowed to govern 
an international contract (proposal for a Regulation of the 
European Parliament and the Council on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations (Rome I) COM(2005) 650 final, 
Art 3: “2.The parties may also choose as the applicable law 
the principles and rules of the substantive law of contract 
recognised internationally or in the Community”). 
This rule was not maintained in the final version of the 
Rome I Regulation. The fact that such sets of rules as, for 
example, the PECL (Principles of European Contract Law) or 
the UNIDROIT Principles of Commercial Contracts are non-
state laws cannot be the decisive criterion for supporters of this 
solution. Professor Sanchez-Lorenzo strongly advocates this 
solution (see “Common European Sales Law: Some Critical 
Remarks”, 9 Journal of Private International Law (2013) 191-217 
at p 216),  however he does not elaborate further to offer a 
doctrinal way out of the firmly established unity of law and 
state doctrine. Political and scholarly resistance to a change of 
the current PIL rules is firm, as the current version of the 
Rome I Regulation in its change from a convention into a 
Regulation showed. 
Rules such as PECL or the UNIDROIT Principles of 
Commercial Contracts have been tailor-made for the needs 
of international traders and their “cross-border” commercial 
contracts. They are lex specialis in relation to domestic contract 
law, even the law merchant of the nation states. This applies 
to the CISG as well. The fact that not even the CISG can be 
made lex contractus even though it is not non-state law, unless 
viewed from a non-signatory state, reinforces the weight of this 
doctrine (states that are not party to the CISG within the EU 
are Portugal, Malta, the UK and Ireland, as mentioned in the 
CESL, EM s 1(p 5)). The CISG can only be used by way of 
implementation, ie by integrating it into national law. 
In Germany, despite having taken this decision, the CISG 
is still not integrated into national law. It is perceived as a 
separate set of rules located outside the national legal system 
and subject to the mandatory rules of the German civil law. It is 
also not printed in the context of the private international law 
rules governing the choice of the CISG or implementing it into 
German law, or indeed in the civil code. The CISG is perceived 
as directly applicable by default within its scope. The act of 
implementation serves the purpose of maintaining the doctrine 
that only state law can govern a contract to the exclusion of 
other law so that answers are predominantly derived from 
that lex contractus. The aim of seeking a uniform international 
instrument to take the role of lex contractus is to place it at 
the top of the hierarchy for purposes of the interpretation 
method. The national law that might then be still applicable via 
conflict rules in matters outside the scope of the instrument or 
where internal gaps cannot be filled otherwise will then play a 
complementary role, not the international instrument. 
The aim is not the displacement of the state as regulatory 
power but to support the cause of the litigating parties which 
cannot reasonably be assigned to a domestic legal order, ie to 
have regard to and acknowledge the international character of 
the underlying situation for which the international law has 
been created. 
(b) Mandatory laws
The doctrine of mandatory laws therefore adds another 
limitation to the choice of governing law, ie both party 
autonomy and the role of the chosen national law, by declaring 
certain rules of yet another domestic law as applicable despite 
not being chosen. The criteria by which these are applicable 
are that they “cannot be derogated from” and that, in the case 
of Article 6(2) of the Rome I Regulation, they are designed 
for consumer protection. The identification of such rules is 
left to the courts as it is often debatable whether or not these 
qualities are assigned to such rules of a given jurisdiction. This 
must also be true for the rule of the CESL. Ultimately it must 
be left to the courts to decide if a rule of the CESL affords 
equal or higher protection for a consumer than his or her own 
national law. The drafters may therefore not be able to exclude 
this value judgement in the way proposed in the current draft 
without modifying Article 6 (2) of the Rome I Regulation.
(c) Lex specialis
The idea of choosing a non-state law as the governing 
law of an international contract is not motivated purely by 
the pastime interest of academics pursuing a niche subject 
(as suggested by P Mankowski, “Rechtswahl für Verträge des 
internationalen Wirtschaftsverkehrs” Recht der Internationalen 
Wirtschaft (2003) Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 
2-15 (13)). It is motivated by making available tailor-made 
law specifically for the needs of “cross-border”, usually 
commercial, contracts. The rules provided by the CISG, the 
UNCITRAL and UNIDROIT conventions – for example the 
Ottawa conventions on leasing and factoring and the 1985 
UNCITRAL Model law on international arbitration – and 
the non-state model laws, the UPICC and the PECL, are lex 
specialis in relation to this type of contract. CESL recognises 
the lex specialis rule along with many jurisdictions (Art 4(3) of 
Annex I). 
The drafters do not seem to recognise though that the 
CESL itself is, or ought to be, lex specialis in relation to the 
general domestic contract law of the MS. This classification 
presupposes that the “cross-border” contract or indeed 
the commercial contract in the case of the CISG and the 
UPICC (UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts, 2010) is a separate contract type and that it has 
typical requirements which domestic contracts may not have 
(see M Heidemann, Does International Trade Need a Doctrine of 
Transnational Law? Some Thoughts At the Launch of a European 
Contract Law (Berlin, Springer, 2012).
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The creators of the CESL would need to reassess whether 
the objectives of the CESL – in addition to simply removing 
differences – include the identification of and provision for 
these typical requirements of “cross-border” contracts. As 
for merchant contracts, these requirements have been at the 
forefront of decades of drafting specialised rules, first by the 
Hague Academy, then by UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL and even 
the EU through some academic groups partly mandated by EU 
organs with this task. Beyond contracts other requirements of 
“cross-border” life such as international marriages, adoption, 
inheritance, law enforcement, taxation and so forth have also 
been recognised as being typical to living in different countries 
which after all is being facilitated by the EU with its four 
freedoms and EU citizenship.
The existence of this permitted “cross-border” life, both 
commercial and private, generates a need for specialised laws. 
In the case of contracts – as they are the subjects of this paper 
– domestic law is not suited to provide a platform for them as 
a matter of course. National legislators enact law within their 
territorial boundaries but the “cross-border” contract unfolds 
in at least two nation states, or in some cases literally nowhere 
in particular. An anchor has to be deliberately and often quite 
artificially attached to aspects of those contracts , and these 
then provide for connecting factors linking the contract which 
may – going by traditional connecting factors such as the place 
of performance – be freely floating in cyberspace or across 
the seas to the law of a particular state. The EU accepts only 
certain types of these anchors in its private international law, 
and they have shifted priorities compared to preceding systems 
of choice of law rules.
Once again, defining these criteria is driven by the 
objectives behind such legislation and the choice of perceived 
beneficiary. Giving “cross-border” traders and purchasers both 
consumers and traders a tailor-made sales law with a high level 
of consumer protection should be an achievable objective. 
The added benefit of tying these traders and consumers to the 
internal market and the EU jurisdiction as well as preserving 
the existing PIL rules may scupper this aim.
The object of the CESL and of all other tailor-made 
transnational law is the “cross-border” contract.  Even 
if this “cross-border” contract is qualified by adding the 
element of the “minimum EU link” (ELI statement, eg (A) 
(ii), p 13), it would still merit the creation of an independent 
truly transnational body of rules which could satisfy the high 
expectations of consumer protection within the EU and 
therefore be recognised as lex contractus to the exclusion of 
national laws including their mandatory laws within its scope. 
If it is correct what the CESL drafters claim, that the CESL 
has a higher level of protection of consumers than the national 
laws, then there should not be a problem modifying both the 
doctrine of mandatory laws and Article 6(2) of the Rome I 
Regulation in order to develop consistent doctrine and practice 
at transnational level, even if it is limited to the EU. This may 
even encourage non-EU users such as Chinese and Swiss 
parties to use the instrument due to its persuasive authority. It 
would then truly allow traders across the EU to use “one and 
the same regime”, and would also confirm the usefulness of 
the interpretation rules in the CESL making the autonomous 
interpretation method and the database mandatory. It would 
have the potential of contributing to the evolution of a 
transnational legal doctrine for the sake of international trade 
by giving the participating EU MS the reassurance that their 
laws are not undermined by this model, but that the CESL 
is meant to be an addition to the arsenal of legal instruments 
providing the infrastructure for “cross-border” trade within 
the internal market.
For a “cross-border” contract to achieve its objective 
requires the action of a transnational, “cross-border”, 
supranational legislator. The EU is the only one available at 
present which has legislative authority most resembling that 
of the sovereign nation state. Other bodies such as the WTO 
and UNCITRAL issue rules within their delegated legislative 
powers. There can be no doubt that EU citizens would benefit 
from the creation of a uniform instrument governing their sales 
contracts, and that the EU with its organs and adjudicating 
body (including the body of case law amassed to date) would 
be a desirable originator of such law. Currently, there seems 
to be indeed a lack of delegated, or within the legal order sui 
generis, authorisation to do that. This is one reason why the EU 
Commission emphasises the pursuit of those objectives that 
are sanctioned by the TFEU – harmonisation of national laws, 
consumer protection and removing obstacles to the internal 
market. 
The EU Commission is currently not furnished with the 
authority freely to provide the people of Europe with their 
own “cross-border” contract law under the TFEU. There is 
of course nothing to stop the MS to create and adopt such a 
uniform instrument in the form a convention which could be 
granted lex contractus status by a modification of the Rome I 
Regulation.
Martijn  Hesselijnk pointed to the limiting effect of the EU 
Treaty at the beginning of the drafting efforts for the DCFR 
recalling the alternative way to achieve the aims of a separate 
convention (see M W Hesselink, “The European Commission’s 
Action Plan: Towards a More Coherent European Contract 
Law?”(2004)  European Review of Private Law 397–419 at s 5 
and n 77, and referring to W van Gerven’s opinion on this 
matter in n 76 who also thought a separate Treaty would be 
the better solution for a European Contract Law; Walter van 
Gerven, “Coherence of Community and national laws; Is there 
a legal basis for a European Civil Code?” (1997)  European 
Review of Private Law 465-69, 468, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1098851, accessed on December 8, 2013).
(d) The role of the state in private law
It is the very idea of binding law emanating from a 
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supranational or indeed non-state source which irritates nation 
states and traditional legal doctrine. Even so, international 
treaties are being entered into but the enforcement and 
interpretation of those is still within a long process of evolution. 
Successful law enforcement among states at international level 
remains one of the great ambitions and achievements of our 
time.  In the area of merchant law, transnational adjudication 
has a much longer tradition and works smoothly and to a large 
extent by voluntary acceptance of awards and agreements 
made within private dispute resolution settings such as 
arbitration centres, or under the auspices of trade associations 
and chambers of commerce.
In the area of contract law, however, there is very little to 
fear from transnational law. The voluntary element that the 
CESL grants its users by making the instrument optional is an 
essential ingredient of contracting. This distinguishes contract 
law from other areas of law which may not be suitable to be 
left to the free disposition of private actors, such as the actual 
enforcement of the awards achieved through arbitration or 
ADR, let alone fields like taxation, policing, and health and 
safety law. There are of course areas in contract law that merit 
state intervention, such as non-discrimination rules, protection 
of employees and consumers. These are elements of public 
policy and for this reason curtailing party autonomy in certain 
areas may be necessary, either at the point of contracting 
and contractual content or at the point of enforcement or 
cancellation. The origin of this necessity is however in civil 
society and its agreed policies rather than in an anonymous 
or non-descript “state” exercising sovereign rights over private 
affairs for its own sake. 
Private autonomy is an axiom of the modern participatory 
nation state of which the EU is comprised. The classic 
term ordre public did not originally cover just any mandatory 
legislation, certainly not in the area of contract law, but certain 
domains of public policy that serve framework values that 
society will not dispense with for reasons of comity (the origin 
of private international law) or trade advantage. This concept 
has been stretched for the sake of maintaining resistance 
against the demands of the growing civil society forming across 
boundaries towards the individual sovereign state claiming co-
operation in a form that was unattainable in former centuries. 
It is the object of the CESL itself – the international contract 
– that still triggers irritation itself on a subtle level. The EU MS 
are still not quite sure if they want to allow borderless trade 
and free movement. They often still fear a loss of income or a 
loss of control over national assets. International trade is not 
always seen as a bringer of welfare (see the rather irrational 
accusations towards Starbucks or Apple recently, or the upset 
about the acquisition of Mannesmann by Vodafone some years 
ago). 
The private actor as the sole direct beneficiary of a uniform 
international legal instrument is seen with suspicion and the state 
– other than a trade association or an academic research forum 
– may not be motivated simply to provide an infrastructure 
for such spontaneous, self-serving and low impact use. This 
explains the need for the integration of public policy objectives 
such as consumer protection or the EU link into the CESL. 
For this reason, connecting factors like habitual residence 
(subdivided as suggested by CESL, Art 3) have become the 
favourite starting point, followed by a list of other connecting 
factors and a fall back rule reverting to the traditional “closest 
connection rule” in Article 4(4) of the Rome I Regulation. 
This has come about despite the uncertainty caused for the 
user, who may not be interested because it may not pertain 
to his contractual objective and benefit. He may also not be 
in a position to know this information about his contractual 
partner at the relevant point in time. 
Traditional private international law did not focus on the 
whereabouts, nationality or occupation of the contractual party 
but on the content of the contract as it is maintained in the 
CISG (Arts 1 and 2). This is a more neutral and convincing 
way of finding a law for the contract, which used to be suitably 
named “the proper law of the contract”. No hold was claimed 
over the person of the contracting party, neither in order to 
protect them nor in order to patronise them. Certain values 
and positions can be safeguarded without reversing the roles of 
the contract and the contracting party.
Whether an EU Regulation itself, rather than the contractual 
agreement, can be “chosen” or voluntarily agreed to, ie be 
made “optional” in the language of the EU legislator, and what 
the precise legal implication of this “choice” or “option” may 
be, is not straightforward. The Regulation itself is most likely 
meant to be permanent and binding, not merely effective upon 
the choice of the CESL of state X by two or more contracting 
parties. It is the sales law itself which is meant to be “optional”. 
Is its binding force suspended until it has been chosen or is 
it effective continuously along with the national contract law? 
The national jurisdiction and judiciary is certainly bound 
to interpret an EU Regulation according to the established 
principles of EU law. But is substantive contract law suitable 
for this, lacking a previous existence within EU law, and can 
the national jurisdiction successfully be obliged to refrain from 
interpreting the CESL in the light of its existing contract law 
and its principles?
E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Aligning form and substance
It is really the “cross-border” contract itself that is the object 
of the CESL. This is a special contract that can be governed by 
a tailor-made contract law. It is not necessary to make the EU 
link part of the definition of “cross-border” contract, but it 
would be possible to limit the scope of the CESL to EU linked 
contracts due to the limited jurisdiction of the legislator. It is 
not advisable to use technocratic tricks like “for the purposes 
of this regulation a chair is a wardrobe” because this alienates 
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the intended users of the sales law.
The “minimum EU link” is not necessary. It would be 
possible for EU MS to make a commitment to the CESL but 
at the same time leave it open to third party states to join 
the CESL or for third party contractors to choose the CESL 
as lex contractus. For these purposes the CESL ought to be a 
convention and not part of an EU Regulation. 
The CESL must be drafted to be a truly transnational 
uniform instrument. The character is international by the 
nature of its object. EU choice of law rules ought to reformed 
to allow the CESL to be lex contractus and Article 6(2) of the 
Rome I Reg must be suspended within the ambit of the CESL. 
The legal basis for this is the lex specialis rule.
2. The relationship to the CISG
In the area of commercial contracts the CISG clearly fulfils 
the aim of providing a uniform instrument throughout the EU 
and beyond. The reluctance to choose the CISG originates from 
the same problem that these instruments cannot be lex contractus 
and so a national law eventually determines the majority of 
issues. A consequence of this is a lack of transnational legal 
doctrine and practice, which leads to uncertainty and ignorance 
among users. The scope of the CISG does not overlap with the 
B2C contracts to be governed by the CESL. There is therefore 
no obvious need generally to exclude the CISG upon a choice 
of the CESL in this area. The CISG could be complemented by 
those aspects that are not currently covered. By acknowledging 
the role of the CISG the EU would contribute to the further 
evolution and development of international law by integrating 
the work done by experts worldwide over several decades, 
rather than creating a purely internal law which has no clearly 
defined relationship with pre-existing uniform law.
 The CISG also provides a good example of defining its 
scope without creating conflicts with concepts of the law 
merchant and commercial contracts in domestic laws. It would 
be possible to add a complementary instrument to the CISG 
by providing a tailor-made “cross-border” consumer contract 
law with the EU as an initial group of signatories.
The Rome Convention on the law applicable to international 
contracts and the Brussels Convention on the enforcement 
of foreign judgements were an example for such a method. 
These could have been opened for third states to join or 
for third states to use as a model. Instead the same inward 
perspective took hold over these affairs and resulted in the 
present regulations. The EU seeks to increase the efficiency 
of its legislation by turning the conventions into regulations 
because they have a more undiluted legal force in each MS, but 
they also limit adjudication to the catalogue of principles and 
accepted doctrine within the EU according to the treaties. In 
any given case the choice of such principles may even be wider 
on the international plain, without the restrictions arising from 
the enabling norms as they are now visible in the case of CESL.
F. CONCLUSION 
CESL proposes what is doubtlessly a unique and innovative 
but overall bizarre solution for the creation and implementation 
of a Common European Sales Law. The objectives are partly 
explicit and partly implied, and are not easily compatible 
with each other. The object itself is distorted by the use of 
a technocratic definition removing it from the common 
understanding of its potential users and beneficiaries. The 
biggest obstacle arises from the reluctance to modify European 
Union PIL and pursuing the unchanged status of the Rome I 
Regulation, especially its Article 6(2), as an implied objective of 
CESL. This leads to the fragmentation of a seemingly uniform 
instrument or “single regime” into 28 regimes with a peculiar 
legal nature. 
This objective may fail if and when national courts or even 
the CJEU dissect the details of the chosen position of the 
CESL within current EU private international law and public 
international law. 
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